C/2007 N3

Although I consistently return to the thematic focus of the book, the twofoldness of being, I think this theme in the end remains underdeveloped, and it is my hope that it provides a starting point for further study.

It is especially important to return to this topic on the basis of what has been presented here, and to take up the question of the implications of this theme as a question for philosophy.

Granted the claim that for Aristotle being is twofold, how is this twofoldness to be understood and what might one learn from it about the meaning of being?

There is no doubt that this task for thinking was the gift that Heidegger received from Aristotle, and that spurred Heidegger onto his own philosophical path.

Heidegger takes up in particular the issue of time and the finitude of being, and the issue of ster¯esis, nonbeing, in addressing these questions as projects.

The central topic that pervades Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle,
and the one above all others that demonstrates his knowedge and insight,
is the topic of kin¯esis.

For Heidegger the problem of movement and the question of the ontological character of moving beings was the fundamental question of Aristotle’s philosophy.Aristotle’s metaphysics entered into this basic aporia that governed the experience of being in ancient Greece,
the difficulty of thinking of the being of motion, the denial of ontological
kin¯esis.

He was able to grasp, on the basis of this question, the meaning of being and thereby to bring to its end the philosophical struggle of his times. The ensuing history of philosophy is the witness to his accomplishment. In our time, called by some the time of the end of metaphysics, we are once
again required to return to the beginning, not out of what some consider to
be a Heideggerian nostalgia for the Greeks, but to stand once again prepared
for a new beginning.